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The large and widening gap between economic performance in Eastern European transition
economies and those of the former Soviet Union has been dubbed “the Great Divide” by Berglof and
Bolton (2002).  This paper provides a rationale for the gap based upon the concept of financial
repression.  The magnified effects of transition to the market can be attributed to the government
manipulation of financial markets in these countries, with the divide defined by the length of time
that governments relied upon financial-market manipulation to finance government fiscal policy.
Policies undertaken to assist in financing government expenditures caused financial
repression and financial fragmentation, to use the terms introduced by McKinnon (1973).  After an
introductory section, I introduce a theoretical model of real and financial sectors in transition.  The
dynamic path to equilibrium from transition is derived.  It is shown to have a tendency toward output
contraction and hyperinflation when government policies promote financial repression.  In the third
section this hypothesis is examined with macroeconomic data from Ukraine for the period 1992 -
2001.  These data are consistent with the hypothesis, although other factors (e.g., recession in trading
partners) are also shown to be important.
JEL Classifications: E21, E44, H11, O16
Keywords: Transition Economies, Financial Repression, Inflation, Real balances
Thanks to participants at seminars at various universities in the US and Russia for comments and
suggestions.  Any and all errors, of course, remain mine.1  This is an unweighted average of data from World Economic Outlook, IMF (various issues).
Russia is by far the largest state among the fifteen, and these characteristics hold for Russia as well.
2  Sargent (1986, p. 81).
3  These quotes are taken from Berglof and Bolton (2002), p. 77.
I.  Introduction.
The formerly planned economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have presented in
the last fifteen years a historic experiment in transition from planned to market economies. While
a transition period was expected before the sum of the parts once again equaled -- and then surpassed
-- the previous whole, this period was expected to be short.  In fact, the transition has been costly,
painful and prolonged for the citizens of these countries.  The downturn in the formerly Soviet states
reached 55 percent on average of its initial production in 1990, and a decade after the transition
began remains 60 percent below the initial level.
1  In the German hyperinflation observed after
World War I there were only two years (1922 and 1923) in which consumer price inflation exceeded
1000 percent.
2  In the formerly Soviet economies inflation was in excess of 1000 percent per annum
in the three consecutive years of 1992-1994.  Clearly, this has been contraction and inflation with
a vengeance. 
In a recent survey article, Berglof and Bolton (2002, hereafter BB) identify a “great divide”
among transition economies.  On one side of the divide are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovenia and the Baltic nations.  In these countries, “economic development has taken off”.  On the
other side are found Bulgaria, Romania, and the non-Baltic countries of the former Soviet Union.
These countries are characterized by “a vicious cycle of institutional backwardness and
macroeconomic instability”.
3    While the authors note a convergence in “financial architecture” in
the countries on the right side of the Divide, they argue that financial-sector policies themselves do
not distinguish the two groups.  Rather, 
“the ability of governments of transition economies to enforce contracts and to
achieve fiscal and monetary responsibility, together with a commitment to refrain
from excessively bailing out failing banks or loss-making enterprises, determined
whether economic and financial development took off.”   Berglof and Bolton (2002,
p. 78), italics in original
The logic of this statement is compelling, but I will argue in this paper that financial-sector policies
are in fact at the heart of this logic.  The missing link in the analysis is summarized in the McKinnon
(1973) concept of financial repression adapted to the structure of the transition economy.  Fiscal and
monetary irresponsibility interacts with excessive control over the interest rates offered by deposit-
taking financial intermediaries to discourage saving.  Low rates of saving perpetuate the slow-
growth equilibria observed on the wrong side of the “Great Divide”.
Section II defines financial repression and financial fragmentation..  A simple theoretical
model exhibiting these features is presented in section III.  Ukraine is singled out by BB as being
positioned on the wrong side of the “Great Divide”.  The observed record of output, inflation and4  Conway (2001) documents these trends in great detail.
5  The averages cited are unweighted averages over the 15 countries.  The data are drawn mainly from
the World Economic Outlook of the IMF, with complementary sources used when necessary.
6  In the early years of the decade, neither the Czech Republic nor Slovenia were separate countries.
I created the averages reported here by (1) using the growth rate for Czechoslovakia for the Czech Republic
in 1991 and (2) excluding Slovenia in 1991 and 1992.  Alternative representations do not change the basic
pattern found in the data.  The dip in output indicated for CHPS understates the real cost of transition for
these countries because output reduction predated 1990.  Even including this, however, the fall in output in
the FSU countries, Baltic or non-Baltic, was more extreme.
7  The authors focus upon Ukraine and Russia, also include Romania and Bulgaria among these
countries.  When that set of countries is considered, the message of Figure 1 remains substantially the same.
financial-asset holding in Ukraine is examined in section IV and is shown to be consistent with the
financial-repression hypothesis.  Finally, section V concludes. 
II.  Illustrating the Great Divide in the Economic Transition.
There have been three phases in the economic transition.
4  The timing differs by group of
countries.  For the former Soviet economies the first phase lasted from 1991 to 1994, and during that
period measured output collapsed to only 50 percent on average of its 1990 level.
5  Inflation surged,
leading to three consecutive years of inflation rates greater than 1000 percent per annum on average.
The second phase, from 1995 to 1997, was one of stagnation in output, as average gross domestic
product remained nearly constant.  However, inflation rates were brought down to near-single digits
on average.  The third phase from 1997 to the present has been one of volatility, with rapid growth
in some years punctuated by crises in others: this is exemplified by the Russian financial crisis of
1998.
The Great Divide is illustrated in Figure 1 by creating an unweighted average of production
in the groups of countries, and then creating a production index with 1990=100 consistent with that
unweighted average.    BB identify two groups of countries on the right side of the Divide.   The first
group is drawn from Eastern Europe:   Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (CHPS)
experienced a substantial downturn in the early years of the 1990s, but recovered steadily in the
following years.
6  By 2001, these countries were on average at higher levels of production than were
recorded in 1990.  The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are also characterized by
BB as being on the right side on the Divide.  As Figure 1 illustrates, these countries experienced
much larger declines in output during the 1990s.  However, by 1994 positive growth had reasserted
itself on average.  Except for a minor downturn in 1999, the trend has been uniformly upward since
1994.  BB characterize the non-Baltic countries of the former Soviet Union as being on the wrong
side.
7  The decline in output lasted longer in these countries, on average, with output declining until
1996.  The rebound since then has been less pronounced, leaving output over 30 percent below its
1990 level on average in 2001.
The Great Divide of BB -- CHPS and Baltics on one side, non-Baltic FSU on the other -- is
even more evident in the record on inflation in these countries.  Figure 2 illustrates the percentage
change in consumer prices in the period 1996-2001.  The inflation rates in the countries on the right8  The years prior to 1996 also illustrate the difference in experience, but cannot unfortunately be
illustrated due to the extremes in scale.  The CHPS countries by 1993 had an average inflation rate less than
30 percent, and this average fell to single digits by 1999.  The Baltic countries had average inflation rate of
1000 percent in 1993, but were able to reduce this to single-digit inflation by 1997, as illustrated in Figure
2.  The non-Baltic FSU countries, by contrast, had average inflation rates that peaked at 2500 percent in 1994.
While the average rate declined thereafter, as Figure 2 illustrates the process had not by 2001 led to single-
digit inflation.
side of the Divide – CHPS and the Baltics – were already low in 1996 and fell still lower thereafter.
The countries on the wrong side of the Divide – the non-Baltic FSU countries – were still on average
battling inflation in 1996, and only by 2001 had the average inflation rate fallen to less than 20
percent per annum.
8
BB provides measures as well of the financial development on both sides of the Great
Divide, and Table 1 summarizes those measures.  Russia and Ukraine are taken in this table to be
indicative of the non-Baltic FSU countries, although they have more sophisticated financial markets
in practice than those of the other non-Baltic FSU.  In some areas, there are only minor differences
in behavior on the two sides of the Divide: concentration ratios, importance of state-owned banks,
and the bad-loan ratios are all roughly the same across the three groups.  There are two strong
indicators of the Divide, however.  Credit to households and enterprises as a share of GDP is much
higher in CHPS than in the Baltics, and higher in the Baltics than in Russia and Ukraine.  The loan-
deposit rate spread is also much different on the two sides of the Divide, with much lower spreads
in CHPS and in the Baltics than in Russia and Ukraine.
The hypothesis of this paper is that the policy manipulation of financial institutions during
the past decade has has been critical in causing and extending the poor economic performance of
the transition economies.  The argument is an application of the concepts of financial deepening and
repression as formulated by McKinnon (1973).  His argument, put simply, is that  intermediation
of the financial sector between savers and investors is crucial to sustained economic growth of an
economy at or near its potential.  In the absence of this intermediation, or in the absence of savers’
confidence in the intermediaries, saving will be discouraged or ineffectively allocated.  Both
outcomes will reduce the economic activity of the economy.
III.  A Theory of Financial Development, and Repression, during Transition.
The Great Divide has opened up, at least in part, because of the severe drop in production
in the non-Baltic FSU countries.  Explanations that rely upon fiscal and monetary profligacy, or
upon excess subsidies to loss-making enterprises, are incapable in general of explaining this feature
of the economies.  In this section I provide a theoretical integration of the explanations of BB with
the missing link -- repressive financial-market policies undertaken by transition governments.  The
hypothesis of this paper is that the budget-deficit explanations of the Divide must be combined with
the effect of governmental interventions in the financial markets to lessen the budgetary cost of
financing the deficits.  The model of this section introduces explicitly the role of the financial
repression so that the government’s efforts to finance its deficit can be assessed.  It abstracts from
the investment decision of the enterprise; as will be seen below, it then provides a focused view of
the importance of working capital to the production process.9  An earlier version of this model is presented and analyzed in Conway (2001).
Financial repression.
McKinnon (1973) defines his concept of financial repression as follows.
Bank credit remains a financial appendage of certain enclaves:   exclusively
licensed import activities, specialized large-scale mineral exports, highly protected
manufacturing, large international corporations, and various government agencies
...Even ordinary government deficits on current account frequently preempt the
limited lending resources of the deposit banks.  Financing the rest of the economy
must be met from the meager resources of moneylenders, pawnbrokers and
cooperatives.  It is this phenomenon that I call financial repression.  McKinnon
(1973, p. 69) 
He attributes this repression to regulated interest rate ceilings and collateral requirements.  Financial
fragmentation describes the economy in which the same transaction in loanable funds will take place
at very different real interest rates for different groups within the economy due to the barriers to
transactions between the groups.  The equilibrium and adjustment path illustrated in this paper is
simply an application of that concept to the transition economies.
Production.
The real side of the economy can be summarized quite simply.
9  There is productive capacity
in the transition economy.  Productive use of this capacity is dependent upon the availability of
working capital as an input to the enterprise.  For given supplies of the other inputs, the quantity
produced yt is increasing as ρt, the real cost of working capital, falls.  The appendix provides a
detailed exposition of such a model based upon the endogenous-degree-of-specialization model of
Becker and Murphy (1992).   Other specifications are possible to yield the same result: Roubini and
Sala-i-Martin (1992) include the cost of credit in the (concentrated) production function, while
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992, 1995) follow Buffie (1984) and van Wijnbergen (1983) in
including a cash-in-advance constraint in the production process.  The concentrated production
technology can be summarized as:
yt = y(Kt, ρt)-  y ρ(ρt/yt) = θ > 0 (1)
with Kt representing the non-credit determinants of output and θ the elasticity of output supply with
respect to the real interest rate.  This production relation is represented by the curve PE in Figure
3.  
Demand and supply of saving.
The enterprise has a demand for saving Lt in period t derived from (1) that is increasing more
than proportionally with output.
Lt  = κ(yt)yt κy > 0 (2)10  The enterprise will in general also have a demand for loanable funds to finance investment
expenditure as well.  This use of funds could be introduced without altering the results, but is excluded to
retain the focus upon output contraction and the financial markets.
11   This corresponds to a fiscal current deficit: expenditure not matched by tax revenues.  Government
expenditure to support state enterprises will enter identically to the present formulation of the enterprises
themselves approaching the loanable-funds market.  
12  This is illustrated most simply in a life-cycle model of income, consumption and storage.  Consider
an individual who will live for N years, and will work for M of those.    The individual has an initial nominal
wealth of Ao denominated in domestic currency, and can invest at real interest rate ρ annually.  The social rate
of time preference is equal to the real interest rate ρ.  The annual nominal after-tax income is Y, and P  is the
price of goods.  Under these assumptions, utility is maximized by equal real consumption C in each period.
Real saving is rising with real income.  It is also rising with the real interest rate on saving instruments.  It
is declining in the real value of accumulated wealth Ao.  It is, in fact, possible to have negative real saving
per period if the stock of accumulated wealth is large relative to the real income per period.  
Real income per period: (Y/P)
Discounted real value of income: V = (Y/P)(1/ρ)(1+ρ-(1/(1+ρ))
M)
Real consumption per period: (1/NP)[Ao + V]
Real saving per period: (Y/P) [1 - (1/(ρN))((1+ρ-(1/(1+ρ))
M)] - Ao/NP
13  There is a solid theoretical basis for the interest-rate elasticity of saving, but controversy over
whether that effect is observed in practice.  Giovannini (1985) rejected the conclusion of significant positive
elasticity in an empirical sample of developing countries.  Ostry and Reinhart (1992), in a dynamic analysis
for a broader sample of developing countries, find significant positive interest-rate effects on saving.
κ(yt) can be interpreted as the demand for working capital as a ratio to final product.
10   The
government will have its own demand for saving related to the consumers’ social safety net.  It is
assumed to equal a fraction γt of output.
11  
The private supply of saving decision depends in theory not only upon current income, but
also upon the real interest rate on saving and the value of accumulated wealth.
12  Define real private
saving in period t as a share σt of real income.  The private saving share is increasing, ceteris
paribus, in the real interest rate and is decreasing in the ratio of real accumulated wealth (At-1/Pt) to
income.
13
σt = σ(ρt, (At-1/Pt)/yt)  σ1 > 0, σ2  < 0 (3)
It will be useful to denote the ratio of accumulated wealth to current income as rt = (At-1/Pt)/yt  and
the real value of accumulated wealth as at = (At/Pt).  The evolution of this wealth can be written
at =At-1/Pt + σ(ρt,rt)yt 
or at = at-1/(1+πt) + σ(ρt,rt)yt (4)14  Note that this relation is not unambiguously true.  The increase in output will lower the
wealth/income ratio rt , and thus will increase saving through that channel as well.  I assume in what follows
that this wealth effect on saving is smaller than the product effect on the demand for credit, and so the real
interest rate must rise to equilibrate.
15  The ruble overhang was a preoccupation of economists working on the initial stages of transition.
See Desai (1989), Nordhaus (1990) and World Bank (1992) for early discussions, and Conway (1997) for
an analytical examination of the phenomenon.
with πt denoting the rate of inflation in commodity price in period t relative to period t-1.  This ratio
is rising with past accumulated wealth, declining with a rise in current inflation, and rising with
current real saving. 
Equilibrium in the supply and demand for saving is ensured by 
γt + κ(yt) = σ(ρt,rt)( 5 )
This condition is an upward-sloping relationship in ρt and yt, and is illustrated as FE in Figure 3.
Increased output increases the demand for saving more than proportionally, and this must be met
ceteris paribus by an increase in the real interest rate to entice greater saving.
14
The BB causes for the Great Divide can be illustrated nicely in this model.  The “crowding
out” effect of fiscal profligacy can be represented by an increase in the current deficit γt, (shifting
the FE curve up) and will reduce output while driving up ρt.  The reduced enforceability of business
contracts is an increase in coordination cost in production (shifting the PE curve down) and will
reduce both output and the equilibrium real interest rate.  
While these equilibrium shifts in output are consistent with the empirical record, they miss
an important feature of the transition – that financial markets were not in equilibrium.  The financial
repression, and fragmentation, of the period are critical to understanding the dynamic of transition.
The Dynamic of Transition: Earmarking and Financial Repression.
Three features of transition financial markets caused the historical record to deviate sharply
from this theoretical equilibrium.  First, the citizens of these economies entered the transition period
with a large accumulation of wealth held in nominal financial instruments.  This was characterized
at the time as the “ruble overhang”, and could be represented in equation (3) as a large
wealth/income ratio.
15    Second, the borrowers of the transition economy initially were largely
limited in the financial instruments they could offer to attract financing.  Specifically, the
government relied upon money creation or credits at non-market rates to finance its budget deficit,
while the enterprise borrowers relied upon the lending of the commercial banking system.  I will
describe this bifurcation of the financial markets as “earmarking”.  Third, savers had access to a
limited  number of saving instruments.   These three features led to a competition for saving during
the transition that induced high inflation and caused large output reductions due to shortage of
working capital. 16  This instrument could equally well be thought of as land or some other asset in limited supply.
The et will in that case be the market price of that asset.  The phenomenon of foreign-currency denominated
deposits will be addressed in the next section.
The savers’ portfolio allocation decision.
Savers could allocate private nominal wealth (At) to the holdings of currency (Ht), domestic-
currency deposits (Dt) and foreign exchange (Ft).  The behavioral equations that characterize this
allocation can be written
Dt = α(ρt,yt) At α1>0, α2<0 (6)
et Ft = β(ρt,yt) At β1<0, β2>0 (7)
Ht = (1-α(ρt,yt)-β(ρt,yt)) At (8)
At = Dt + Ht + etFt (9)
The shares α and β define the percent of private wealth allocated to deposits and foreign exchange,
respectively.  The real interest rate on domestic deposits ρt is equal to the nominal interest rate on
those deposits (it) minus the domestic inflation rate (πt). The real interest rate on foreign currency
is equal to zero.
16  The partial derivatives of the α and β functions are indicated by subscripts
corresponding to the position of the arguments and are governed by the adding-up constraints
outlined in Tobin (1969).  For given yt, and for Ft and Ht determined at any point in time, equations
(6) through (9) can be solved for endogenous variables Dt, et, ρt, and At. 
The private saving ratio σt plays an important role in this portfolio allocation.  Private 
saving is the source of the flow demand for financial assets as a whole, while stock-shifts from one
asset to another can also occur in response to relative-price changes.  These effects can be derived
by differencing equations (6) through (8).  They are deflated by the current price level to indicate
comparable real values.
(Ht - Ht-1)/Pt = - [α(ρt,yt)-α(ρt-1,yt-1) + β(ρt,yt)-β(ρt-1,yt-1)] rt yt + 
(1-α(ρt,yt)-β(ρt,yt)) σ(ρt, rt) yt (10)
(Dt - Dt-1)/Pt = [α(ρt,yt)-α(ρt-1,yt-1)] rtyt +  α(ρt,yt) σ(ρt, rt) yt (11)
(etFt-et-1Ft-1)/Pt = [β(ρt,yt)-β(ρt-1,yt-1)]rtyt +  β(ρt,yt) σ(ρt,rt) yt (12)
The first term on the right-hand side of these equations is the portfolio reallocation effect; it sums
to zero across the three equations. The second term represents the allocation out of current saving,
and sums to private saving across the three equations. 
Earmarking equilibria. 
If borrowers of loanable funds can transact in the markets of all three financial instruments,
then the equilibrium outcome depicted in Figure 3 will be observed.  However, governments in
transition economies have in many cases been precluded from borrowing from the commercial
financial system for current budget deficits and precluded from borrowing in foreign currency.  In
that case, seigneurage from money holdings becomes the sole source of finance for the government17  One can argue that seigneurage is itself borrowing from the financial system, since the government
floats bonds which are purchased by the central bank.  It is most illuminating in this discussion to consider
the central bank as part of the government, so that financing must occur “downstream” from the central bank.
18  An increase in the supply of foreign currency will come about through a reserve settlement surplus
due either to positive net exports of goods and services, to borrowing from foreign sources, or to central bank
intervention in the foreign exchange market.  These are exogenous to the portfolio allocation choice.
19  The exchange rate will depreciate with inflation, as savers bid up the value of this inflation-
resistant asset.  It will also depreciate with growth in income , both through the use of foreign currency as a
medium of exchange and through the impact of income growth in encouraging saving.  A rising real interest
rate will have two offsetting effects on the exchange rate.  There is an appreciating effect of the shift in asset
demand toward deposits and away from foreign-currency holding, while there is a depreciating effect of the
rise in saving and thus demand for all assets.  A rise in the real value of accumulated wealth will cause an
appreciation as it reduces the propensity to save.  
current budget deficit.
17   Another common financial feature of transition economies is that
enterprises have no access to seigneurage finance, but are able to approach the commercial banking
system.  The demand for saving is then financed through domestic deposits.  These two restrictions
can be stated 
γt = (gt-τt) = -[α(ρt,yt)-α(ρt-1,yt-1)+β(ρt,yt)-β(ρt-1,yt-1)]rt + (1-α(ρt,yt)-β(ρt,yt))σ(ρt, rt) (13)
κ(yt) = [α(ρt,yt)-α(ρt-1,yt-1)] rt +  α(ρt,yt) σ(ρt, rt) (14)
 The quantity of foreign currency available for savers’ portfolios is fixed by the past record
of the balance of payments, and its interest rate is held to be zero.
18   The observed equilibrium
values of ρt and rt will define the portfolio demand for foreign currency holdings etFt.  Excess
demand for foreign currency, for example, will lead to a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate
to return the savers’ portfolios to desired balance.
19 
Financial Repression and the Great Divide.   
The simplest illustration of financial repression, and the genesis of the Great Divide,  follows
from the “ruble overhang” episode of the early 1990s.  With the liberalization of commodity
markets, the governments of the FSU countries encountered a shortage of real saving.  This shock
(illustrated by a comparative-static shift upward in the FE curve in Figure 2) will lead in an
integrated financial market to an increase in real interest rate to induce more saving.  In the FSU
countries, however, the government maintained ceilings on nominal interest rates offered on saving
deposits.  This led to financial repression as illustrated in Figure 4.  The curve HH represents the
money-market equilibrium (13), while the curve DD represents deposit market equilibrium (14).
The size of the ruble overhang (at-1) illustrated by point B ensured that equilibrium could not be
observed in both markets.  The government, through money creation, met its budgetary needs.
Inflation surged to ensure equality in (13).   The real interest rate to savers was in many cases
negative during this period.  This reduction in real interest rates also discouraged saving.  While
enterprises were quite willing to borrow at the observed negative real interest rate, there were no
funds available.  The enterprises rather had to reduce operations – and thus output – to a level
consistent with the remaining availability of credit.  The real interest rate on lending consistent with
this degree of financial repression will be called the virtual interest rate ρ
~
t.  It is in excess of the real20  The coefficients φ, φo, φ1 and φ2 are all defined to be positive.  See the appendix for details.
21  For example, point Bi could be the combination consistent with 60 percent inflation.  If the
nominal interest rate is 3 percent, then the real interest rate is  -57 percent and the (at-1/(1+πt)) ratio is 62
percent of its original value.
22  Many transition governments used direct deposit of wages and restrictions on deposit withdrawal
to meet partially this excess demand for deposits.  The cash shortage phenomenon discussed by Conway
(1997) is precisely this, with the government refusing to meet the demand for real balances and thus forcing
the portfolio holders to retain more deposits than desired.  
23  The DR locus represents for each value of at-1/(1+πt) that virtual real rate of interest at which the
enterprises will choose to borrow the quantity of loanable funds deposited with the banking system by savers
facing the observed real interest rate ρ.  For example, ρ
i is the real interest rate observed due to the
inflationary pressures of money creation.  It reduces saving below the quantity underlying the DD locus (since
the value of accumulated wealth is the same, but the real interest rate is lower), and thus the virtual real
interest rate must be above that indicated by DD to reduce enterprise demand for funds to equal the quantity
made available by savers 
deposit rate because of the excess demand among enterprises for financing.  Financial fragmentation
resulted, and the gap between lending and deposit interest rates widened.
The behavior of the inflation rate can be characterized by total differentiation of equation
(13).  This operation is reported in the appendix and summarized in equation (15).  The coefficient
η is positive, while η2 is negative.   Inflation stems from three sources here: the increased demand
for financing for the budget deficit, the saving-reducing effect of a large accumulated wealth, and
the ambiguous effect of increased nominal interest rate.  Accumulated wealth is itself a function of
the inflationary record as well as of the propensity to save, falling in the former and rising in the
latter.  The “virtual” interest rate that would have generated that level of output at that level of
accumulated wealth is illustrated in Figure 4.  As is evident in equation (17), presented in detail in
the appendix, this virtual interest rate is rising with inflation – even as the observed real interest rate
on deposits is declining.
20
dπt/(1+πt) = (1/η)[dγt - η2 (dat-1/at-1) + (η + η2)(dit/(1+it))] (15)





t = (1/φ) [φo(dπt/(1+πt)) - φ1 (di/(1+i)) + φ2 (dat-1/at-1)] (17)
Inflation serves to increase saving, other things equal, by reducing the purchasing power of
accumulated wealth.  It also serves to increase the attractiveness of money relative to deposits by
reducing the real interest rate.
21  The first-period adjustment ends at Bi.  
At Bi the government’s primary deficit γt has been financed, but the supply of deposits falls
short of firms’ demands for working capital.
22  The real interest rate in this example is negative, at
ρ
i, and induces saving consistent with that rate and accumulated wealth.  The “virtual” value of the
real interest rate that would just equate demand from the firms with that supply is denoted ρ
~i on
locus DR.
23   Specialization and output thus fall as a consequence of the financial fragmentation.
The next period a similar adjustment occurs, to Bii.  As the wealth overhang is eliminated, for24In a financially repressed economy, the holdings of foreign currency provide the potential for
development of an interest-bearing saving instrument to serve as an alternative to the domestic deposit.  Firms
seeking working-capital funding can offer positive returns on foreign-currency loans, either to banks as
intermediaries or directly to savers.  If the foreign-currency deposit differs from the domestic deposit only
in its currency of denomination, a result similar to that of the “curb market” literature of Buffie (1984) and
van Wijnbergen (1983) follow: the government’s efforts at financial repression will lead to savers’ shift from
domestic deposit holdings toward foreign-currency holdings.  The real interest rate on foreign deposits,
denoted qt, becomes the cost of capital for the marginal enterprise.  The real interest rates on the two
instruments can diverge sharply.
This opportunity can be modeled as follows.  Redefine the portfolio choice shares in equations (6)
through (8) as:
Dt = α(ρt,yt,qt) At (6')
etFt = β(ρt,yt,qt) At (7')
Ht = (1-α(ρt,yt,qt)-β(ρt,yt,qt)) At (8')
with the impact of ρt and yt on the portfolio shares as above, and with α3 < 0, β3 > 0, 1-α3-β3 < 0.
The preceding equilibria were those characterized by qt = 0.  Firms continue to demand 
κ(yt) units of loanable funds per unit of total product.  However, the enterprises discover in the financial-
repression equilibrium that at the margin available loanable funds will be found in the foreign-currency
market.  Similarly, savers will discover that the preferred marginal return on saving is in foreign exchange.
Thus, in contrast to (1) and (3), the level of enterprise output and household saving will depend  as in (1') and
(3') upon the real rate of interest qt in the foreign-currency funds market.  
yt = y(Kt, qt)-  y q(qt/yt) = θq > 0 (1')
σt = σ(qt, (At-1/Pt)/yt)  σq > 0, σA  < 0 (3')
The equilibrium conditions in the financial market will be amended versions of (5) and (13), with the
specifications of α(.) and β(.) taken from (6') through (8') and with y(.) and σ(.) defined in (1') and (3'). 
There are two policies available to the government to eliminate financial fragmentation.  The first
is to remove controls in the domestic credit market, allowing ρt to rise to market-clearing rates.  The second
is to increase the quantity of foreign saving made available to the economy, thus pushing down the real
interest rate on foreign-currency deposits to a rate equal to that of domestic-currency deposits.  The first
encourages domestic saving, while the second encourages an accumulation of foreign debt.  
constant nominal interest rate, the virtual real interest rate on deposits declines and specialization
rises once again.  However, the fragmentation of financial markets is not eliminated by this dynamic
so long as nominal interest rates are fixed.  The zero-inflation equilibrium after this dynamic is Bv
in Figure 4, with virtual real interest rate on lending ρ
~v still in excess of ρo.  
As Table 1 indicates, there are substantial differences across the Great Divide in two
categories: in credit not issued to the government as a percent of GDP, and in the lending-deposit
rate spread.  In the model of this section, economies with financial fragmentation will be
characterized by just these differences when compared with integrated economies.  The repression
leads to inadequate saving and thus rationing of enterprises in search of credits.  It also leads to large
gaps between the interest rates offered on deposits and on loans, with the deposit rate artificially low
and the lending rate biased upward.
24The “ruble overhang” period illustrates most graphically the implications of financial
repression for extreme inflation and output reduction, but there are output costs as well to financial
repression even after the inflationary pressure has dissipated.  The real interest rate observed in the
domestic financial market is less than in the non-repressive equilibrium, and the virtual interest rate
offered by enterprise borrowers is greater than that in the non-repressive equilibrium.  The virtual
interest rate on lending determines the level of output, which will then be strictly below that
observed in non-repressive equilibrium.  
IV.  Financial Fragmentation: Ukraine on the Wrong Side of the Divide.
I examine the record of economic growth and inflation in Ukraine for evidence of the
financial-repression hypothesis.  Ukraine is a logical candidate for such an investigation.  First,
Ukraine was not subject to the ethnic conflict and separatist movements that have made economic
activity in countries like Georgia and Tajikistan more perilous – these countries faced a true “supply
shock” more fundamental than misguided financial policy.  Second, it is a relatively large, developed
economy with good statistical agencies.  Third, Ukraine as an economy has exhibited the tendencies
of contraction and inflation in more intense fashion than the average of former Soviet economies.
As Figure 5 illustrates, the output contraction has been more pronounced and more prolonged for
Ukraine than for the former Soviet economies on average.  In Figure 6 it is evident that  the
inflationary episodes in Ukraine were quite pronounced, and certainly in line with the other non-
Baltic FSU countries. 
The theoretical discussion of the previous sections suggests that these macroeconomic factors
can be explained through reference to the repression and fragmentation of the financial sector in
Ukraine.  The shortage of credit led to the output contraction, while the repressive financial-sector
policies caused a shortfall in deposit-holding that led to the credit contraction and to the inflationary
pressure.  In this section I examine the evidence for these hypotheses in turn.
Data.  
The data used in this section are drawn from two sources.  The major source for
macroeconomic information is the Ukrainian-European Policy and Legal Advice Center (UEPLAC).
These data are of various length and frequency: at best they cover the period from the beginning of
1992 to the fourth quarter of 2001, and are available on a quarterly or monthly basis.   The
International Financial Statistics of the IMF are used for data on Russia and Germany. 
Credit shortage as a cause of output contraction.
 As noted previously, there are a number of alternative hypotheses advanced for the output
contraction observed in the formerly planned economies: demand contraction, energy price increases
and the breakdown of the resource allocation system are three advanced in the literature, while this
paper suggests the credit-market channel as a cause.
Table 2 reports a hypothesis test on output determination using quarterly data from 1993/1
to 2001/4.  Base real output growth is modeled as a first-order autoregressive process in25  Phillips-Perron t-tests for unit roots reject the presence of a unit root.  The statistics are calculated
for non-zero mean and are:
Without time trend With time trend
τ Pr < ττ Pr < τ
ln(yt) -2.85 0.06 -1.74 0.71
ln(CRt) -3.28 0.02 -3.22 0.10
ln(Ryt) -2.96 0.05 -3.19 0.10
ln(Wt/Pt) -3.28 0.02 -2.85 0.19
The results without time trend are more consistent with the hypothesis test undertaken here, and suggest that
differencing the data is not necessary to ensure stationarity.  I will also report the results with differencing
(and a time trend) however, for comparison.
26  The logarithm of real GDP in Germany was included as a proxy for European demand pressures,
but its coefficient was found to be insignificantly different from zero.
27  Significance is measured in this study by 95-percent confidence intervals.
28  Note that an alternative model of the real interest rate on deposits and the volume of credits offered
in the economy will consider them as simultaneously determined variables.  The current model is based upon
a sequential financial-intermediation model, where deposits attracted in period t-1 are lent out as credits in
logarithms.
25  To this minimal specification are added three variables to represent various hypotheses
for output collapse.  The logarithm of the real wage lagged one quarter (ln(Wt/Pt)) is added to proxy
for worker productivity in the transition.  The logarithm of the index of real gross domestic product
in Russia (ln(Ryt)) represents the contraction in demand from the economies formerly members of
the Soviet Union.  The logarithm of total credits to households, enterprises and government as a
share of gross domestic product (ln(CRt)) models the credit channel effects on output.  The credit
variable is treated as simultaneously determined with ln(yt); the two-stage least squares technique
is used to derive the coefficients and standard errors reported.
26  
The evidence of the first column of figures indicates an economy with rather low persistence
of real output growth, with significant but small autoregressive coefficient of 0.23.  The passthrough
coefficient of shocks from the Russian economy to the Ukrainian economy is both large and
significantly different from zero, with a 10 percent decline in Russian output correlated with a 5.6
percent decline in Ukraine.
27  The impact of productivity on output is positive with elasticity of 0.38.
There is also support for the hypothesis of this paper, as the elasticity of increased credit share in
output is positive and significant at 0.28.  A 10-percent decline in CRt  will lead to a 2.8 percent fall
in yt.
The second column reports the reduced-form model of ln(CRt) implied by the data.  There
is a larger autoregressive coefficient of 0.67.  The budget surplus as a share of GDP (bt) makes an
insignificant but positive direct contribution to credit share with semi-elasticity of .46.   The real
interest rate on deposits at commercial banks lagged one period (ρt-1) is included to proxy for the
financial intermediation channel at the heart of this paper, and its semi-elasticity is both positive and
significantly different from zero at 0.06.  This provides additional support to the financial repression
interpretation of output collapse.
28 period t.  I plan to address the simultaneous model in the future (i.e., once more data points are available).
29  Tests of stationarity send mixed signals for these variables as well.  The Phillips-Perron t statistics
for non-zero-mean processes are:
No Time Trend Time Trend
τ Pr < ττ Pr<τ
πt -2.65 0.09 -3.21 0.10
at -2.39 0.15 -2.08 0.54
CRt/PBt -10.60 0.001 -8.96 0.001
bt -2.88 0.06 -5.76 0.001
The unit root is clearly rejected for the fragmentation ratio and the budget surplus/GDP ratio.  For πt and at
there are indications of a unit root.  However, this would be a unit root with time trend toward zero.  I report
results for stationary processes in the text.
The system of equations was estimated as well in error-correction form.  This transformation
should preserve the coefficients of the model if the series are stationary, and should correct for non-
stationarity and measure cointegration if it exists.  The results are reported in Table A1.  In both
equations, the intercepts (measuring the time trend) are both positive and significant.  In the output
equation, the coefficients on worker productivity and Russian passthrough are quite similar.  The
coefficient on the credit share, however, becomes smaller and insignificantly different from zero.
In the credit share equation, the real interest rate on deposits retains its positive and significant
contribution to the availability of credit.  The autoregressive coefficients are insignificantly different
from zero in each case, while the error-correction term in the output equation takes the expected
negative sign.
Inflation as a product of accumulated purchasing power.  
The theory of the preceding sections suggests that budget deficits will be inflationary, and
especially those deficits financed through credits extended by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU)
to the government.  However, the new contribution of this theory is the independent effect of private
purchasing power at on inflation.  In Table 3 I examine these competing theories in two separate
regressions using quarterly observations for the periods 1993/2 through 2001/4.
29  The first column
represents inflation as an autoregressive process dependent upon its own persistence, the budget
surplus as a share of GDP (bt) and at (defined as the stock of M2 to GDP including only assets
denominated in local currency).  Inflation is modeled as jointly determined with the holdings of M2
as a share of GDP: that equation is specified as an autoregressive process with a Cagan effect of
inflation πt, bt and a measure of the financial fragmentation of the economy defined as the lagged
ratio of credit to the economy over payables due (CRt-1/PBt-1): a rise in this should indicate a
reduction in fragmentation.
The inflation equation has a strong autoregressive component.  An increase in the size of the
budget surplus as a share of GDP has the expected effect of reducing inflation, but its coefficient is
insignificantly different from zero.  By contrast, the impact of private real asset holdings at is
positive, as predicted, and significantly different from zero.  This supports the dissaving-based
theory of inflation.  
It is useful to consider as well the implied behavior of local-currency-denominated financial30  This estimation was redone using foreign-currency denominated component of M2 as a ratio of
GDP as the dependent variable.  The resulting coefficients (not reported, but available on demand) were
insignificant for all regressors except the lagged dependent variables, suggesting that the dichotomy between
local-currency-denominated assets and foreign-currency-denominated assets is a meaningful one in explaining
inflation – as the theory of this paper implies.
31  For example, if currency is more substitutable for foreign exchange than are deposits in portfolio
holdings then the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate will cause the ratio to fall.
holdings ratio at.  As the second column of Table 3 indicates, the estimation results return a quite
sensible demand-for-assets function.  There is strong and significant persistence in the ratio.  There
is also a significant negative effect of current inflation on domestic-asset holding.  There is a
positive and significant association between budget surpluses and the M2/GDP ratio, indicating a
reduction in “crowding out” of private asset holding, while the lagged fragmentation ratio has a
significant coefficient.  Its positive sign is also consistent with the financial-repression theory of
inflation.
30
Financial repression in private portfolio allocation.  
The portfolio allocation decision is a key component of the process of financial deepening.
As demonstrated in the previous section, the shift from other assets to bank deposits in the investor’s
portfolio is hypothesized to be in response to increases in the real interest rate, other things equal.
Data on the volume of money in circulation (Ht) , credit offered by commercial banks (CRt),
real GDP (yt), total hryvnia-denominated deposits (Dt), and the weighted real interest rate on
deposits at Ukrainian commercial banks (ρt) are available on a monthly basis.  It is also possible,
using household survey information from the same source, to decompose aggregate money and
deposit holdings into shares held by households and by other actors (whom I here refer to as
enterprises).  Two (Ht/Dt) ratios can then be calculated.  (Ht/Dt)
h is the ratio of currency holdings to
deposit holdings by households in period t, while (Ht/Dt)
e is the same ratio for enterprises.  These
data are available for the period October 1995 to December 2001.
The theory of the preceding section predicts that the (Ht/Dt) ratio will be a negative function
of the current ρt and a positive function of yt when currency is more liquid for transactions purposes
than are deposits.  An increase in the interest rate on foreign-exchange-denominated assets is also
predicted to have an effect, but the direction of the effect is contingent upon the relative
substitutability of currency and deposits, respectively, for foreign exchange.  While there is no
consistent interest rate on foreign-exchange-denominated assets available, the nominal depreciation
rate of the USD/Hryvnia exchange rate (δt) is used as a proxy.
31 
I test these hypotheses with a version of equations (10)-(12) amended to include the impact
of δt and random uncorrelated errors εit, i=h,d,f.
∆ht = (Ht - Ht-1)/(Ptyt) = - [α(ρt,yt,δt)-α(ρt-1,yt-1,δt-1) + β(ρt,yt,δt)-β(ρt-1,yt-1,δt-1)] rt + 
(1-α(ρt,yt,δt)-β(ρt,yt,δt)) σ(ρt, rt) + εht (18)
∆dt = (Dt - Dt-1)/(Ptyt) = [α(ρt,yt,δt)-α(ρt-1,yt-1,δt-1)] rt +  α(ρt,yt,δt) σ(ρt, rt) + εdt (19)
∆ft = (etFt-et-1Ft-1)/(Ptyt) = [β(ρt,yt,δt)-β(ρt-1,yt-1,δt-1)]rt +  β(ρt,yt,δt) σ(ρt,rt) + εft (20)32  The results for the Phillips-Perron test (for non-zero mean) on the monthly observations are:
 No trend Time trend
τ Pr < ττ Pr < τ
∆dt -5.49 0.001 -5.59 0.001
∆ft -8.56 0.001 -8.53 0.001
∆mt -8.66 0.001 -9.41 0.001
ρt -4.60 0.001 -4.64 0.002
δt -8.44 0.001 -8.38 0.001
yt -4.24 0.002 -4.50 0.003
σt -7.65 0.001 -8.18 0.001
The hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected in all instances at the 95 percent level of confidence.
The endogenous variables in this system of equations include δt, ρt and ∆dt.  The variables exhibit
stationarity in the Phillips-Perron sense.
32  The behavioral relations α(.), β(.) and σ(.) establish a set
of cross-equation restrictions that are imposed in what follows, with the functions modeled in linear
form.
α(ρt,yt,δt) = αo + α1 ρt + α2 yt + α3 δt (21a)
β(ρt,yt,δt) = βo + β1 ρt + β2 yt + β3 δt (21b)
σ(ρt,rt) = σo + σ1 ρt + σ2 rt + σ3 δt (21c)
Estimation is complicated by the fact that the real interest rate and the depreciation rate are
endogenous variables.   The theory suggests an econometric solution: model the system of equations
(18) - (21c) as jointly determining δt, ρt , σt and ∆dt.   The result of this estimation strategy using
iterative two-stage least squares is reported in the first column of Table 4.
The impact of relative prices on portfolio shares take the expected signs for the most part:
α1, as the effect of the real interest rate on deposits on the share of wealth allocated to deposits, has
a positive and significant coefficient; β3, the effect of exchange-rate depreciation on the holdings of
foreign currency, is also positive as expected, although insignificantly different from zero.  The real-
income effects on portfolio shares indicate that both deposits (α2) and foreign-currency (β2) holdings
fall as real income rises; the implied transactions demand for money (-β2-α2) is positive as expected.
The hypotheses of this paper are tested most directly by considering the sign and significance
of the determinants of σt.  The impact of the real interest rate on saving, other things equal, is both
positive (2.15) and significantly different from zero.  The impact of accumulated wealth on saving
is negative (-0.04) and significantly different from zero.  The impact of exchange-rate depreciation
on saving is positive (37.13) and significantly different from zero.  The preconditions of the
financial-repression explanation for inflation and saving stagnation are thus confirmed in the data:
a positive effect of real interest rates on the saving ratio, and a negative effect of accumulated wealth
on saving.
Specifications (2) and (3) in Table 4 report two restrictions on the original system.  In (2) I
impose the restriction that δt does not enter the portfolio-share equations (21a) and (21b), but
maintains its role in (21c).  This implies that δt is determined exogenously.  The results maintain the
qualitative features of (1):  signs expected in the portfolio-share coefficients are observed, and the33  These equations are each estimated as one of a three-equation simultaneous system using two-stage
least squares, with the real interest rate ρt and the real exchange rate re
^
t as other endogenous variables.
Details are given in the note to Table 4.
34  If the time trend is excluded, the remaining regressors have a jointly insignificant explanatory
power as measured by the F statistic.
crucial features of the saving coefficients remain significant as well.  In (3) the specification is
further simplified by exclusion of δt from the saving equation.    This leads to infinitesimal changes
in the portfolio-share coefficients and maintains the main results of the saving equation – although
the real-interest-rate effect σ1 is no longer significantly different from zero.
The results of Table 4 are derived with maintained hypothesis of portfolio-share equations
(21a) and (21b), and with the cross-equation restrictions that these portfolio shares imply.  A less
restrictive test of the theory can be derived through creating ratios of asset holdings from (6') - (8'),
and results of this estimation are provided in Table 5.
33   The theory predicts that savers will
substitute from other assets into deposits as ρt rises.  This is evident in the first column, where the
(Ht/Dt) ratio is reported for households; the coefficient is both negative (-35.33) and significantly
different from zero.  For enterprises, the (Ht/Dt) ratio also responds negatively, but with effect
insignificantly different from zero.  The impact on the (Ht/etFt) ratio is insignificantly different from
zero, in line with the ambiguous prediction of theory.  Theory also predicts that substitution will
occur from domestic assets to Ft as the real exchange rate (re
^
t) rises.  This is evident in the final
column, although the effect is not significant.  The transactions demand for Ht is evident in the
significant positive coefficient (34.00) in the final column, but the results of the first column indicate
that substitution from currency to deposits also occurs as yt rises.
Enterprises, as represented in the results of the second column, have a much lower
currency/deposit ratio on average, as the relative size of the intercepts indicates.   The regression
explains a smaller percentage of the variability of the ratio.
34  Exchange-rate depreciation does not
affect the ratio significantly.  Since enterprises conduct business largely through sight deposit
accounts, the response to an increase in yt is to reduce their currency-deposit ratio. 
V.  Conclusions.
This paper contributes two building blocks to the effort to construct a theory of the output
contraction and hyperinflation observed in the former Soviet economies during the 1990s.  First, a
theory is advanced that finds the root of both these events in repressive financial policies in the
transition economies.  Second, data for the Ukrainian economy are found to be consistent with this
theory.
Berglof and Bolton (2002) provides an intriguing characterization of the bifurcation in
financial-sector experience in transition economies, and identifies a number of critical differences
between high-performing and low-performing economies.  This paper builds upon its
characterization while providing a crucial addition to the logic.  Financial-sector policy is not
peripheral to performance, but rather can be placed at the heart of any explanation of diverging
performance.  I argue, and provide empirical support, for the proposition that financial repression
á la McKinnon (1973) is fundamental to the understanding of the prolonged and painful transition.There are a number of remaining steps to be taken to support the conclusions of this paper.
First, the theoretical model is a simple one, and excludes the potentially important physical
investment decision of the enterprise.  While I conjecture that this will introduce an additional
demand for loanable funds that will intensify the pressures discussed here, it is important to do this
explicitly.  Second, the data analysis remains sketchy.  The production theory advanced here is most
directly examined through analysis of firm-level decision-making; I will be looking into the
availability of data for analyzing the degree of coordination directly.  The portfolio choice analysis
could also be productively expanded through consideration of additional stores of wealth.Bibliography
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CHPS 34.0 64.1 24.8 14.7 4.6
Baltics 18.1 69.1 19.4 7.1 7.3
Russia/Ukraine 8.9 59.1 27.2 8.2 30.2
Source: Berglof and Bolton (2002), Tables 1 and 4.  
Non-government domestic credit/GDP refers to credit to households and enterprises as a share of GDP.
Concentration ratio is defined as the ratio of three largest banks’ assets to total banking sector assets.  The loan rate is
defined as the average rate charged by commercial banks on outstanding short-term credits to enterprises and
individuals, weighted by loan amounts.  Deposit rate is defined as the average rate offered by commercial banks on
short-term deposits, weighted by deposit amounts.Table 2 
GDP Function Regression Results
(Quarterly data, 1993/1 to 2001/4)



























N3 2 3 2
s – Treated as simultaneously determined variable.  Instruments include lagged endogenous variables, budget
deficit, and exogenous regressors in these equations.  Standard errors reported in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 95 percent level of confidence.Table 3
Consumer Inflation Rate: Ukraine






























N3 2 3 2
Jointly endogenous variables marked with s; two-stage least squares used in estimation.  Instruments include
lagged dependent variables and other independent variables in equation.  Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. * indicates significance at the 95 percent level of confidence.Table 4















































N 6 86 86 8
Statistical method used: iterative two-stage least squares.  In (1) a four-equation system was estimated with endogenous
ρt, δt ∆dt and rt.  In (2) and (3), a three-equation system was estimated in ρt, ∆dt and rt.  In each case, cross-equation
restrictions on parameters are imposed.  In (2), δt is treated as an exogenous variable.  For all equations,
contemporaneous exogenous and lagged endogenous and exogenous variables are used as instruments.  * indicates
significance at the 95 percent level of confidence, and standard errors are in parentheses..   Table 5

















s - 6.73 2.56 -0.95
(157.40) (5.57) (0.53)
yt - 35.47 







N 7 17 16 9
R





Each of these equations was estimated in a three-equation system by two-stage least squares.  The three
simultaneously determined variables were the asset ratio, ρt and re
ˆ
t, and these are marked with s above.
The variable t represents a time trend.  The variables used as instruments in the first stage included yt , lagged
values of the endogenous variables, CRt-1, µt-1, and the growth rates of these two variables.  For the F statistic,
x=3 for the first equation, and x=4 in the second and third equations.  Statistics in parentheses are standard
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Figure 5: Ukraine on the Wrong Side of the Output Divide
Figure 6: Ukraine on the Wrong Side of the Inflation DivideAppendix A
Derivation of Dynamic Equations for Earmarking Equilibrium
Money market equilibrium:
γt = (gt-τt) = - [α(ρt,yt)-α(ρt-1,yt-1) + β(ρt,yt)-β(ρt-1,yt-1)] rt  +
(1-α(ρt,yt)-β(ρt,yt)) σ(ρt, rt) (13)
dγt = (1-α-β)σA rt (dat-1/at-1 - dπt/(1+πt))
- ρt((σt+rt)(αρ+βρ) - (1-α-β)σρ)(dρt/ρt)
- (yt(αy +βy)(σt + rt) + (1-α-β)σA rt) (dyt/yt)
but  (dyt/yt) = - θ (dρt/ρt)
and (dρt/ρt) . di/(1+i) - dπt/(1+πt)
then define:
ηo =  ρt((σ+ rt)(αρ+βρ)) > 0
η1 = yt(αy +βy)(σ+ rt) < 0
η2 = (1-α-β)σA rt < 0
η3 = ρt(1-α-β)σρ > 0
η = ηo-η3-η2(1+θ)-θη1, assumed positive
dγt = η2(dat-1/at-1 - dπt/(1+πt)) - (ηo-η3) (dρt/ρt) - (η1 + η2) (dyt/yt)
= η2 dat-1/at-1 - η2 dπt/(1+πt) - (ηo - η3 - θ (η1 + η2) )(di/(1+i) - dπt/(1+πt))
= η2 dat-1/at-1 - (η2 - ηo + η3 + θ (η1 + η2)) dπt/(1+πt) - (ηo - θ (η1 + η2) )di/(1+i)
dπt/(1+πt) = (1/η)[dγt - η2 (dat-1/at-1) + (η+η2)(di/(1+i))]
Deposit-market equilibrium:
κ(yt) = [α(ρt,yt)-α(ρt-1,yt-1)](rt +  α(ρt,yt)σ(ρt, rt)) (14)
[ytκy + (α/(1-α-β))η2 - ytαy (σt+rt)](dyt/yt) = [(σt+rt)αρ+ ασρ]dρt
+ (α/(1-α-β))η2(dat-1/at-1 - dπt/(1+πt))
Define:
φ = θ(ytκy  - ytαy (σt+rt) + (α/(1-α-β))η2) 
φo = [(σt+rt)αρ+ ασρ] + (α/(1-α-β))η2
φ1 =  [(σt+rt)αρ+ ασρ] > 0




t = (1/φ)[φo dπt/(1+πt) - φ1 (di/(1+i)) + φ2 (dat-1/at-1)]
Updating equation, accumulated wealth:
at = at-1/(1+πt) + σ(ρt,rt))yt (4)
dat-1/at-1 = -πt/(1+πt) + σ(ρt,rt)yt/at-1
= (-πt + σ(ρt,rt)/rt)/(1+πt) 
Exchange rate depreciation:
(etFt-et-1Ft-1)/Pt = [β(ρt,yt)-β(ρt-1,yt-1)]rt +  β(ρt,yt) σ(ρt,rt) yt (12)
det/et = πt - (dFt/Ft) + (yt/βat){[(1+β)σt + rt (1-σA/yt)](dyt/yt) + (βρ(σt+rt)+βσρ)(dρt/ρt)35  Note that the intermediate enterprises and the assembly enterprise are treated assymmetrically with
respect to time.  Enterprises do not have working- capital demands in production of intermediates.  The
assembly enterprise does have working-capital demands, but only for those intermediates not produced
internally.
36  The construction of productivity as a function of current training alone is that of Becker and
Murphy.  An alternative specification will measure the impact on productivity not only of current training,
but of training in prior periods.  The specification used here is analogous to an investment decision that
depreciates completely in one period.
Appendix B
The Endogenous-Specialization Model: an Example
The economy examined here has a final product yt available at the end of period t.  It is assembled
from a set of Z intermediate inputs (indexed by z).  Each enterprise employs 1 worker in each period and
has stocks of capital K(z) specific to production of each of the intermediate goods.  The final product is
assembled  by combining the Z intermediate inputs with a fixed quantity of energy ξ. The enterprise
producing this final good is the “assembly enterprise”.
Intermediate inputs are produced at the beginning of period t and sold to the assembly enterprise. 
The assembly operation occurs throughout period t.  The final good is complete at the end of period t and
is sold to the consumer at that time.  The assembly enterprise thus has a need for financing, since its cost
expenditures occur at the beginning of the period but its revenues are only available at the end of the
period.   The working capital necessary for that financing must be obtained in some way.
35
Transition on the supply side of the economy.  The productive capacity in these countries was
constructed during the Soviet period.  There remains a debate over whether the placement and scale of
production embodied in this capacity reflected profit-maximizing principles. [...] A model of the
transition process must then admit the possibility of production re-allocation in the face of the changing
incentives to producers offered by the transition to freer markets.  The following model of production,
based on the endogenous-specialization model of Becker and Murphy (1992), does so.
Consider production of a quantity of final product yt in period t.  It is created through the
combination of Z intermediate products Yt(z) with a quantity ξt of an energy input.  The complementarity
of intermediate goods and energy in production is represented as the Leontief production function (1), so
that at efficient resource allocation the Z+2 quantities yt, Yt(z) and ξt are identical.  In a market economy a
firm contracts with producers of Yt(z) and ξt to obtain these inputs and  then assembles the final product
yt.  In the command economy of the Soviet Union the central planner directed this assembly.
Each enterprise is endowed with 1 unit of labor and K(z) units of capital specific to each
intermediate good.  A fraction λt(z) of the labor is allocated to the production of each intermediate good. 
With full employment, the sum of λt(z) for all z is equal to one.  Each λt(z) is divided between production
labor βt(z) and labor in training τt(z).  The productivity Et(z) of the production labor is determined by K(z)
and by the training time τt(z).   The parameter θ>0 determines the marginal productivity of time spent in
worker training.
36  Increasing the share υ>0 of capital in production also is assumed to raise productivity
through mechanization of tasks.  The parameter δ is a measure of productivity for unit use of the two
factors.  Energy does not require labor resources for production.
yt = minz,ξ{Yt(z), ξt}( 1 )
Et(z) = δK(z)
υτt
θ(z) (2)37  This assumption is made to keep the complete production process to a single period.  The logic
of the model is maintained if intermediate goods also take a period to produce.
Yt(z) = βt(z)Et(z) = βt(z)δK(z)
υτt
θ(z) (3)
Two decisions are made at the enterprise level (or by the central planner on behalf of the enterprise):  (1)
what fraction of work force to allocate to training and to production of each intermediate, and (2) how
many intermediate goods to produce.  
Worker allocation within industry.   For production of each intermediate good the λt(z) are
allocated between τt(z) and βt(z).  Optimal allocation of worker time to maximize Yt(z) yields the
condition (4) and the concentrated form (5) of the production function.
τt(z) = (θ/(1+θ))λt(z) (4)
Yt(z) =  δK(z)
υ (1/(1+θ))λt(z)[(θ/(1+θ))λt(z)] 
θ 
= B(δ,θ)  K(z)
υ λt(z)
(1+θ) (5)
    With B(δ,θ) = (1/(1+θ))δ
 [(θ/(1+θ))] 
θ Bδ > 0, Bθ > 0
Output is increasing in both factors of production, with economies of scale evident in the use of labor. 
Output is increasing in the elasticity of productivity with respect to training time θ through two channels –
first through the impact of employment, and second through the total factor productivity measure B(δ,θ). 
Output is also increasing in the productivity coefficient  δ through the total factor productivity measure. 
Varieties of intermediate goods.  For simplicity, assume that any of the enterprises could
undertake the assembly through costless entry.  The intermediates have price normalized to unity, while
the final-good price is a mark-up over the cost of inputs.
The final good yt could be created by each enterprise using its available labor to create all Z
intermediates.  There are, however, economies of scale available through specialization.  If nt identical
enterprises cooperate by each producing a subset of the intermediate inputs, then the number of inputs
produced per enterprise is ψt = Z/nt.   The work force at each enterprise will be divided into intermediate-
input teams, with 1 = λt(z)ψt.  The quantity produced of the intermediate is then an exponentially
increasing function of nt as in (6):




Specialization (i.e., rising nt) thus has its benefits. By this reasoning, and for a given stock of
labor and capital, each enterprise has the incentive evident in (6) to increase its specialization indefinitely. 
However, specialization also has coordination costs.  Becker and Murphy (1992) and Davis (1999)
provide the logic of the endogenous-specialization decision: the enterprise will choose to specialize up to
the point where the marginal returns from specialization are just equal to the marginal coordination cost
of doing so. 
Working capital and coordination costs.  As Figure 1 illustrates, production occurs in stages. 
Production of intermediate goods must precede the assembly of the final goods.  For simplicity, I assume
that intermediate goods are produced instantaneously at the beginning of the period, and are sold to the
assembly enterprise at that time.
37  Energy must also be purchased at that time.  Assembly takes the entire
period, with the sale of the final good at the end of the period.  The assembly enterprise must then pay for
its inputs at the beginning of the period, but receive payment for its product at the end of the period.  It
thus needs working capital equal to the value of intermediate goods and energy purchased from other38  The firm’s endogenous choice of the range of transactions to be governed by external borrowing
is logically similar to the household’s choice of consumption transactions governed by various payment
mechanisms (including money) found in Cole and Stockman (1992).  Thanks to Lewis Davis for pointing this
out. 
enterprises.
Working capital creates a coordination cost in this model because the assembly firm pays in
advance only for energy and the intermediate goods purchased from other enterprises -- the cost of
intermediate goods produced internally need not be financed.  Thus, if the assembly firm produces all
intermediate goods itself, its working-capital requirements are only for energy purchases.  If the assembly
firm produces a small range of intermediate goods, it will have a larger working-capital requirement for
purchase of the remaining intermediate goods as well as of energy.    The demand for working capital to
purchase intermediate goods is equal to [1 - (1/nt)]Yt(z)Z.   The cost of working capital is determined by
the real interest rate ρt in the formal financial sector.
38  The costs of working capital (CFt) will be
increasing in the number of intermediate goods purchased from other enterprises as stated in (7).  Each
enterprise will maximize the net returns from specialization (ψtYt(z) - CFt).  The first-order condition from
the enterprise’s specialization choice yields the optimal specialization level in (8).
CFt = ρt [(vt/Z) + (1-(1/nt))]Yt(z)Z (7)
nt
* = (θ/(1+θ))((1+ρt)/ρt)(Z/(vt+Z)) (8)
The optimal degree of specialization is increasing in Z and in θ.  It is declining with an increase in the real
interest rate ρt and the cost of energy vt. 
The first-order condition summarized in (8) provides a locus of combinations of ρt and nt that
achieve optimal resource allocation for the productive enterprise.  This locus is illustrated in Figure 2 and
is denoted PE.  Total output is increasing and final-good price decreasing as ρt falls along the locus.
Consider as example the costs of adjudicating contract disputes with other enterprises (CJt).  If
there is a possibility of breach of contract, then these costs will be increasing in the number of enterprises
supplying intermediate goods to the assembler as in (i).   It may be useful to think of this cost in expected
terms.  Each contract with an intermediate supplier will either be honored or breached, and the probability
of a given number of breached contracts is rising with the number of suppliers. The Soviet era will be
represented by setting the value of co equal to .01, and independence with co = 1.  The institution-building
necessary to re-establish the judicial system can be represented by the long process of returning co to .01,
but is not modeled in this discussion.
CJt = contYt(z)Z (i)
The optimal degree of specialization by the enterprise can be derived by maximizing the value of
output net of coordination costs in (ii).   The first-order condition yields (iii) that holds for optimal choice
of nt.





θ < 0. The optimal degree of specialization is, as expected,
increasing in θ and decreasing in the cost of adjudicating contractual disputes (co).
Maxn (ψtYt(z) - CJt) = Z B(δ,θ) K(z)
υ  Z
-(1+θ) [nt 




1/2 nθ > 0, nco < 0 (iii)
The observed degree of specialization in the Soviet era is thus not necessarily optimal, and some“optimal” adjustment may be observed with the transition to post-Soviet institutions.  Interpreting this
coordination cost as the cost of adjudicating breached contracts puts the Soviet period in a positive light,
for such adjudication was not typically a concern.  However, coordination costs may also be modeled as
the costs to Soviet planners of keeping track of and making consistent the entire flow of inter-enterprise
transactions.  These costs – in terms of time and skilled planners – will be increasing with the degree of
specialization, and will yield a calculation similar to that of (ii) for the allocation of the scarce time and
skill resources.  Transition to the market may then, other things equal, support increased specialization. 
The final-good relative price can then be calculated as a mark-up over the input prices:
Ptyt - CJt = Σz Yt(z) + vt ξt
Pt = Z + vt + (Zcont
*)( i v )




with the mark-up the final term in the expression.  Note that this calculation presumes that the assembler
has no monopoly power in the final-good market.  This is justified by the threat of entry of other
enterprises in the assembly process.  If the assembler knew that any increase in cost would be passed on
in the final-good price, then its behavior would not be bound by the profit-maximizing calculus described
here.  The description of behavior in that instance would be more closely defined by the “soft budget
constraint” analysis of Kornai (1980).  The threat of costless entry by other assembly enterprises is
sufficient to keep the final-good price at this level.  The relative price Pt is increasing in the price of
energy input, the productivity parameter θ and the coordination cost co.
This theory predicts that even with full employment there will be output reductions if the degree
of specialization falls.  Equation (iii) provides an indication of the potential reasons for such output
reduction in the degree of specialization.  Notably, an increase in the coordination costs of production will
lead to reduction in specialization and a fall in production of final goods.  As (iv) illustrates, the increase
in coordination cost will also cause the price of final goods to rise relative to the price of energy inputs or
intermediate goods.Figure A1
Production Process: Intermediate and Final GoodsTable A1: Estimation of Output Equation in Error-Correction Form
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2 0.81 0.64 0.80 0.62
* indicates significance at the 95 percent level of confidence. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.. 
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